The Spartans defeated the Athenians in the Peloponnesian War in part because their grand strategy involved using the Syracusans in a proxy war, Professor of History Paul Rahe argues in a new book published in September.
“Sparta’s Sicilian Proxy War” is the fifth volume in a series that Rahe is writing on Spartan grand strategy.
“Grand strategy differs from strategy,” Rahe said. “Strategies aim at something narrow. Grand strategy is a broader policy pursued by statesmen that includes diplomacy, military power, economic development, and intelligence. It is something for the long run.”
Rahe said the grand strategy concerning world powers has not shifted, since countries are still concerned with the same fundamental needs that they have had throughout history. What has changed is the technology, and strategists need to adjust to it.
“Nobody’s really written on Greek antiquity with an eye to these questions – thinking long term,” Rahe said. “What are their security needs, what kind of political regime do they have, and what kinds of imperatives grow out of that regime?”
The book covers the moments in the Peloponnesian war from the years 418 to 413 B.C.
“His book is sure to help the reader of Thucydides better understand the seldom-spoken Spartan side of the Peloponnesian War,” said Luke Sherman, a graduate student.
Sparta was agrarian, with elements of democracy inside the aristocracy, and Rahe said it depended on the labor of a subject people who were sometimes rebellious.
“Sparta is a power that wants to defend what it’s got, and the strategy it developed in the sixth century was to form an alliance within the Peloponnesus that would keep the Argives out, the Helots down, and the Spartans in the position that they were in,” he said. “Athens, on the other hand, was a democracy, which meant the poor had the majority of the votes, and as a consequence of the Persian Wars, it had become a naval power that depended on resources from the cities it protected from Persia.”
Rahe said that because of its relationship with other groups it was protecting, Athens was an expansionist empire, and that the Spartans wanted to rein them in once the Persians were less of a threat.
For a while, Rahe said, Athens and Sparta were at an impasse because of the different conditions each military excelled in.
“The sea power can’t defeat the land power very easily; the land power can’t defeat the sea power very easily, and it goes on and on,” Rahe said. “What the books do is that they look at the origins of the Spartan formation of a grand strategy by trial and error.”
Rahe said that the Spartan use of Syracuse as a proxy in the Peloponnesian War has implications for modern proxy wars, such as the war in Ukraine.
“Spartans are absolutely essential for an understanding of what happened in Sicily, and it’s pertinent to us. Proxy wars have not been studied much,” Rahe said. “The main question to pay attention to is whether we can achieve our ends at an acceptable cost, and in recent times, the question has often been no.”
Students and professors alike say they are excited to read the book.
“Dr. Rahe teaches history as if he were weaving an intricate tale. He transports you to a world long past,” said sophomore Katrina Sumarli.
